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To live together with others
– from Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity1 
HAMAUZU,	Shinji
Abstract:
	 At	 the	 turning	point	of	19th	 century	 to	20th	 century,	 from	 the	modern	
period	 to	 the	 contemporary	 period,	 the	 first	 philosopher	who	 regarded	
“others”	as	one	of	 the	fundamental	problems	of	philosophy	and	wrestled	with	
it	 for	 the	first	 time	 in	 the	history	of	European	philosophy	was	 the	 founder	of	
phenomenology,	Edmund	Husserl.	However	he	didn't	 remain	concerned	 the	
problem	of	 “other	minds”,	 such	as	 the	question	 “How	can	 I	get	knowledge	
about	other	minds?”,	but	grasped	the	problem	of	“others”	 in	wider	sense	and	
stated	 it	as	 the	“fundamental	problem	of	phenomenology”.	He	tried	to	discuss	
his	 investigation	on	 “others”	 as	problematics	of	 “intersubjectivity”	 since	his	
early	period.	They	are	on	the	one	hand	a	inquiry	into	the	relationship	“between	
subject	and	subject”,	but	on	the	other	a	problem	of	 the	relationship	“between	
subject	and	object”,	namely	a	thought	that	the	world	in	itself	is	no	object	apart	
from	the	subject,	but	is	constituted	“intersubjectively”.	Husserl	investigated	the	
theory	of	“others”	just	in	such	a	context.	His	problematics	of	“intersubjectivity”	
were	connected	 to	 traditional	and	contemporary	philosophers.	They	are	also	
intertwined	with	most	of	problems	he	investigated	in	various	ways:	through	the	
contrast	between	ontology	and	phenomenology,	we	notice	that	they	come	into	
the	structure	of	“phenomenon”	and	are	related	to	one	of	fundamental	concepts	
of	phenomenology,	i.e.	the	term	“intentionality”.	The	very	idea	of	“intentionality”	
broke	the	dualistic	scheme	of	“subject	and	object”	that	was	presupposed	in	the	
modern	philosophy,	and	gave	birth	to	the	idea	of	“between”.	Thus,	we	can	say	
that	the	idea	of	“intentionality”	prepared	the	phenomenology	of	“intersujectivity”	
as	the	“fundamental	problems	of	phenomenology”.	This	is	just	the	clue	to	solve	
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why	almost	every	problem	Husserl	investigated	is	connected	to	problematics	of	
“intersubjectivity".
1.　Introduction
In	the	U.S.	the	presidential	candidate	Mr.	Donald	John	Trump	insists	that	
a	huge	wall	against	Hispanics	from	Mexico	should	be	built	and	the	frontier	should	
be	guarded	against	Islamic	refugees	from	the	Middle	and	Near	East,	with	the	motto	
“America,	First!”.	He	 is	 supported	by	 those	who	hope	 to	prevent	 foreigners	and	
others	minority	 to	groups	 from	living	 in	America.	Also,	a	referendum	in	the	U.K.	
was	held	in	June	of	this	year,	and	British	citizens	voted	in	favor	of	the	U.K.	to	leave	
the	European	Union,	an	event	commonly	 refered	 to	as	 “Brexit”.	One	of	 reasons	
why	people	voted	 for	 “Brexit”	was	an	antipathy	against	a	growing	numbers	of	
Islamic	refugees	and	migration	to	Britain	in	general.	After	the	vote,	attacks	on	non-
British	people	were	reported	 in	 the	media.	Similar	 tendencies	are	 to	be	 found	 in	
other	European	countries	including	Germany	and	France.	It	seems	me	that	people	
in	the	western	world	are	losing	sight	of	how	we	can	live	together	with	others,	and	
especially	“foreign	others”.	When	I	began	to	research	Husserl's	phenomenology	of	
intersubjectivity	in	the	1990's,	about	28	years	ago,	I	had	a	similar	impression	when	I	
was	confronted	with	the	situation	after	the	fall	of	Berlin	Wall	and	the	collapse	of	the	
Soviet	Union	as	well	as	other	East	European	socialistic	countries,	a	concern	worse	
by	splitting	of	Yugoslavia	and	Czechoslovakia.
2.　Husserl as founder of philosophy on others
At	 the	 turning	point	of	19th	 century	 to	20th	 century,	 from	 the	modern	
period	to	the	contemporary	period,	 the	first	philosopher	who	regarded	“others”	as	
one	of	 the	 fundamental	problems	of	philosophy	and	wrestled	with	 it	 for	 the	 first	
time	 in	 the	history	of	European	philosophy	was	 the	 founder	of	phenomenology,	
Edmund	Husserl.	It	is	not	accidental	that	many	philosophers	who	were	respectively	
193 臨床哲学 18号
influenced	by	him	and	 took	over	 the	 spirit	 of	phenomenology	differently,	 e.g.	
Heidegger,	Levinas,	Schutz,	Sartre,	Merleau-Ponty,	 even	 if	 they	used	 the	 term	
“phenomenology”	or	not,	 they	engaged	with	 the	problem	of	“others”	more	or	 less	
in	 their	own	ways,	offering	different	perspectives.	Because	 in	so	 far	as	 they	 turn	
their	eyes	towards	the	 idea	of	“phenomenon”,	 they	cannot	help	ask	“for	whom”	 it	
appears	and	ask	about	the	difference	or	the	sameness	between	the	“phenomenon”	
appearing	 “for	me”	and	appearing	 “for	 the	other”.	 In	 this	sense,	phenomenology	
cannot	help	but	include	the	problem	of	the	“other”	as	one	of	its	essential	concerns	
from	the	beginning.	This	 is	 just	 the	key	of	solving	the	following	enigma:	Why	the	
philosophers	who	were	 influenced	by	Husserl,	despite	 taking	different	directions,	
nonetheless	kept	the	problem	of	“others”	as	central	to	their	work.
Another	 interesting	point	was	 that	 those	philosophers	 took	over	 the	
problem	of	 “others”	 from	Husserl,	but	developed	 their	own	theory	of	 “others”	by	
criticizing	Husserl's	 theory	of	“others”	 from	their	own	points	of	view	respectively.	
Although	they	took	over	Husserl's	spirit	regarding	 it	as	a	 fundamental	problem	of	
philosophy,	all	who	engaged	with	Husserl's	ideas	were	not	satisfied	with	his	theory	
of	“others”.	However,	Husserl	himself	was	not	entirely	satisfied	with	the	theory	he	
himself	developed,	and	this	is	evidenced	by	the	following	example.
The	fifth	meditation	of	Cartesian	Meditations 	written	based	on	the	speeches	
in	Paris	and	Strasbourg	1928	of	his	later	years	is	well	known	as	Husserl's	theoy	of	
“others”.	This	work	was	first	published	1931	in	a	French	translation	(partly	worked	
on	by	the	young	Levinas)	.	What	he	added	to	the	manuscript	of	speech	with	almost	
the	same	amount	as	the	original	one	at	the	publication	was	the	fifth	meditation	in	
question.	Cartesian	Meditations 	was	almost	a	patchwork	of	manuscripts	 that	was	
gathered	quickly	 from	notes	he	had	written	untill	 then,	and	was	by	no	means	a	
systematically	controlled	work.	Although	Husserl	afterwards	 intended	 to	 revise	
it	 to	a	precise	German	version,	he	had	other	plans	 for	publication	 in	 those	days.	
The	plan	of	revision	was	not	realized	 in	his	 life,	and	the	original	German	version	
Cartesianische	Meditationen	 was	published	 in	1950	as	 the	 first	 volume	of	 the	
Husserliana ,	 the	complete	works	of	Husserl,	based	on	 the	efforts	of	 the	Husserl	
194 臨床哲学 18号
Archive	later.	
The	 theory	 of	 “others”	 in	 the	 fifth	meditation	 of	 the	Cartesianian	
Meditations 	 is	nothing	but	 the	 tip	of	an	 iceberg,	works	 that	he	saved	through	his	
wrestling	with	 the	problem,	and	 there	remain	 lengthy	manuscripts	 several	 times	
more	than	the	published	one	about	 the	problem	of	“others”.	They	were	published	
as	Towards 	Phenomenology	of	 Intersubjectivity ,	 the	13th	 to	 the	15th	 volume	of	
Husserliana 	1973.	They	are	composed	of	massive	drafts	 that	began	in	1905	when	
he	had	 just	 thought	of	 the	 “phenomenological	 reduction”	and	continued	 for	30	
years	to	1935	just	before	his	death.	They	covered	almost	all	periods	when	he	faced	
philosophy	and	were	entwined	with	every	problem	he	coped	with.	Although	there	
are	some	manuscripts	for	his	lectures	among	them,	most	are	“working	manuscripts”	
and	were	not	offered	 for	publication.	They	were	not	 expression	of	 a	 finished	
thought,	but	a	document	of	his	thinking	processes	in	a	“state	of	being	born”,	in	his	
unique	style	of	writing	by	 thinking	with	 the	stenography	called	 “Garbersberger”.	
What	must	be	emphasized	here	 is	 that	almost	all	of	 this	work	by	Husserl	 in	these	
three	volumes	are	remained	unknown	to	the	philosophers	I	mentioned	above,	and	
so	many	of	Husserl's	philosophical	 successors	were	simply	unaware	of	 the	 ideas	
contained	within	these	volumes.	Those	who	attempt	to	wrestle	with	Husserl's	theory	
of	“others”	must	not	get	along	not	only	with	Cartesian	Meditations ,	but	work	with	
the	three	volumes	of	Towards	Phenomenology	of	Intersubjectivity .
3.　Problematics of “Intersubjectivity”
	
Problematics	of	 “Intersubjectivity”,	Husserl	named	as	a	 title	of	 all	 the	
problems	of	“others”,	are	on	the	one	hand	a	inquiry	into	the	relationship	“between	
subject	 and	 subject”,	but	on	 the	other	a	problem	of	 the	 relationship	 “between	
subject	and	object”,	namely	a	thought	that	the	world	in	itself	is	no	object	apart	from	
the	subject,	but	is	constituted	“intersubjectively”.	Husserl	investigated	the	theory	of	
“others”	just	in	such	a	context.	This	characterizes	Husserl's	theory	of	“others”	and	it	
is	decisive	because	it	is	not	impossible	to	understand	it	without	this	context.	What	
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does	it	mean?
What	 is	 the	nature	of	“others”?	Normally	I	don't	call	my	family	members	
like	my	wife,	children,	parents,	 siblings	 “others”.	But	 in	 the	sense	of	 “physically	
separated”	we	can	call	even	the	most	 intimate	 family	members,	everybody	except	
myself,	“others”.	Moreover	there	 is	another	usage	of	 this	 term	according	to	which	
we	call	“other”	or	“different”	or	“foreign”	people	“others”.	For	 instance	women	are	
“others”	 for	men,	children	are	“others”	 for	adults,	elderly	are	“others”	 for	minors,	
foreigners	are	“others”	for	nationals,	and	vice	versa.	To	widen	the	example,	students	
are	 “others”	 for	 teachers,	patients	are	 “others”	 for	doctors,	cared	 for	persons	are	
“others”	for	caregivers,	disabled	persons	are	“others”	for	persons	without	disabilities,	
and	vice	versa.	In	this	sense,	men	or	women	are	not	“others”	for	each	other,	adults	
or	children	are	not	“others”	 for	each	other.	We	don't	draw	a	 line	between	“I”	and	
“others”,	but	between	“we”	as	a	group	in	various	senses	and	“others”	as	a	different	
group.	Also,	 the	concept	of	 “others”	doesn't	presuppose	 that	 “others”	are	human	
beings.	After	all,	all	animals	are	“others”	for	humans,	if	we	take	animals	as	subjects,	
humans	are	“others”	e.g.	for	a	wild	bear,	dogs	are	“others”	for	monkeys.	
If	we	 return	 to	human	beings,	 in	everyday	 life,	we	make	contact	with	
“others”.	When	we	greet	them	unintentionally,	talk	about	work	or	study,	go	together	
somewhere	and	do	something	together,	we	know	they	are	“others”,	but	never	think	
about	 them	as	“others”.	There	 is	no	space	for	using	the	term	“others”	 in	everyday	
life.	But	once	something	happens	that	changes	the	situation,	the	“other”	to	whom	I	
have	some	kind	of	relation,	changes	suddenly	to	the	foreign,	estranged	and	unfamiliar	
-	“other”,	a	person	who	is	thinking	something	I	don't	understand.	Suddenly,	persons	
around	me	become	foreigners	for	me	or	I	myself	become	a	foreigner	for	them.	They	
appear	suddenly	as	“others”.	Imagine	e.g.	when	I	fall	 in	depression,	into	dementia	
or	when	I'm	informed	that	I	do	not	have	long	to	live	because	of	cancer.	The	term	
“others”	comes	 to	be	used	 in	everyday	 life	 suddenly,	and	 in	 the	 introduction	of	
“others”	disrupts	our	way	of	 thinking	and	acting	 in	 the	world.	Thus	we	can	say,	
against	“others”	as	the	fact	of	affairs	the	term	“others”	brings	an	unusual	thing	which	
we	didn't	have	in	our	daily	life.	Here	I	would	like	to	call	problems	emerging	from	
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usual	“others”	to	unusual	“others”	as	the	theory	of	“others”.
If	 we	 look	 back	 over	 history	 of	 philosophy,	 the	 European	modern	
philosophy	which	René	Descartes	opened	with	 the	 thought	 “Cogito	ergo	sum 	 (I	
think,	 therefore	 I	am)”	was	 fundamentally	a	philosophy	which	 intended	to	make	
“I”	or	“subject”	the	starting	point,	where	the	theory	of	“others”	was	not	considered	
as	a	philosophical	problem.	Descartes	 thought	 “Good	sense	 (Reason)	 is	given	 to	
everybody	innately”,	“The	certainty	of	sum(I	am)”	is	applied	to	everybody	who	can	
“think”.	He	never	imagined	that	“you	think”	or	“he	or	she	thinks”	is	not	certain,	but	
doubtful,	whereas	“I	think”	is	certain	and	undoubted.	What	we	can	say	about	“me”	
we	can	say	about	“everybody”	as	well.	He	overlooked	the	difference	between	“I”	and	
“everybody”.
The	English	empiricist	John	Locke	thought	differently.	He	denied	“innate	
ideas”	which	according	to	Descartes	are	innate	commonly	to	everyone	and	thought	
that	human	beings	are	born	in	the	state	of	“tabla	rasa 	(white	paper)”	and	get	every	
cognition	from	“experience”.	Different	persons	get	different	 ideas	through	different	
experiences.	The	English	empiricism	school	 took	 for	 the	 first	 time	 the	difference	
between	“I	and	others”	seriously	and	brought	 it	 into	question.	According	to	Locke	
“I”	can't	see	“ideas	 in	the	mind”	of	“others”	and	only	can	reason	them	by	analogy	
through	words	and	bodys	as	outer	 “signs	of	 ideas”.	By	succeeding	 to	Lock's	 idea	
of	“other	minds”	David	Hume	intended	to	consider	“sympathy”	as	a	way	to	“other	
minds”	 in	 “human	nature”.	Although	J.	S.	Mill	 in	19th	century	 tried	 to	explain	 it	
with	“reason	by	analogy”,	 the	German	translator	of	Hume's	A	Treatise	of	Human	
Nature ,	 Theodor	 Lipps	 criticized	Mill's	 discussion	 and	 developed	 “empathy	
(Einfühlung)”	 as	 	 fundament	of	aesthetics	and	ethics.	 In	 this	way,	 the	question	
“How	can	I	get	knowledge	about	other	minds”	was	discussed	in	the	tradition	of	the	
English	empiricism	since	Locke	and	further	by	other	thinkers	in	the	contemporary	
philosophy.	 Ludwig	Wittgenstein 's	 discussions	 from	 his	Tractatus	 Logico-
Philosophicus 	 (Logical-philosophical	Treatise )	 to	his	Philosophical	 Investgations	
on	 “other	minds”	 stayed	 in	 the	 same	 tradition.	We	might	expand	 that	 thought	
further,	 “the	 theory	of	mind”	discussed	 in	 the	contemporary	primatology	or	 the	
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developmental	psychological	study	of	autism	offers	an	expansion	of	 thought	along	
similar	lines.	Recently,	through	the	discovery	of	“mirror	neuron”	people	have	begun	
to	discuss	the	theory	of	“empathy”	in	the	connection	with	neuro-science,	I	mention	
it	only	in	passing	here.
4.　How did Husserl’s discussion on “others” come about?
	
How	did	Husserl	develop	an	 interest	 in	 the	question	of	 “others”?	In	 the	
first	investigation	titled	“Expression	and	meaning”	of	his	breakthrough	work	Logical	
Investigations 	vol.2	 (1901),	when	he	mentioned	“expression	 in	the	communicative	
function”	 in	contrast	 to	“expression	 in	 the	solitary	mental	 life”,	he	mentioned	the	
question	of	“others”	for	the	first	time.	He	said	that	communicating	with	words	only	
becomes	possible	by	 “the	 listener's	understanding	 the	 speaker's	 intention”	 and	
“the	 listener's	grasping	the	speaker	as	a	person	who	doesn't	produce	only	sounds	
but	is	talking	to	oneself” .	Thus	he	said,	“speaking	and	listening,	i.e.	the	speaker's	
letting	 the	mental	 experiences	 know	and	 listener's	 receiving	 them	are	 related	
to	each	other.	Therefore	 the	 “expression	 in	 the	communicative	 function”	works	
as	 “sign	 for	 speaker's	 thoughts”	and	he	called	 it	 “function	of	 letting	know”.	The	
listener's	understanding	of	speaker's	 letting	know	is	neither	a	conceptual	knowing	
nor	reasonable	 judging,	but	 it	means	“listener's	 intuitionally	grasping	speaker	as	a	
person	expressing	so	and	so”.	Then	Husserl	said,	“In	the	ordinary	usage	we	apply	
the	word	 'perception'	 to	 the	mental	experience	of	other	persons	and	we	say	 that	
we	'see'	his	or	her	anger	or	pain.	Such	a	usage	is	totally	right.”	He	continued,	“The	
listener	perceives	 the	speaker's	expressing	his	or	her	mental	experiences,	and	 in	
this	sense	the	 listener	perceives	the	speaker's	experience.	But	 the	 listener	doesn't	
experience	 it	by	him-	or	herself,	doesn't	have	any	 'inner'	experience	but	only	an	
'outer'	experience”.	He	proceeded	to	say	that	a	“mutual	understanding”	is	realized,	“it	
demands	a	mutual	relationship	developed	in	both	sides	of	letting	know	and	getting	
it,	but	no	complete	equality”.	But	his	 interest	concerned	the	 following	 issue;	 that	
“also	in	the	mental	 life	without	transmitting	in	communication,	the	expression	has	
198 臨床哲学 18号
an	 important	role”,	 that	“even	the	expression	 in	 the	solitary	mental	 life	expresses	
something	and	has	 the	same	meaning	as	 in	conversation”,	and	entered	 into	 the	
meaning	function	which	works	in	both	scenes.	Thus	he	continued	his	discussion	by	
leaving	the	question	concerning	how	we	get	know	about	other's	experience	aside.	In	
Logical	Investigations 	he	never	returned	back	to	the	problem	of	“others”.
The	 stimulus	 from	 the	 above	mentioned	 Lipps'	 theory	 of	 “empathy”	
seems	to	have	triggered	him	to	consider	 the	problem	of	“others”.	The	publication	
of	Logical	 Investigations 	 inspired	many	scholars;	one	of	 them	was	 the	group	of	
scholars	around	Lipps	in	Munich	University.	They	visited	Husserl	in	Göttingen	often	
(later	called	Munich's	phenomenological	 school).	Probably	 in	such	an	exchange	
Husserl	was	 interested	 in	Lipps'	works	and	theory	of	“empathy”.	Max	Scheler	was	
in	those	days	among	this	group,	and	later	joined	Husserl's	circle	in	Göttingen,	and	
cooperated	with	the	editing	of	The	Yearbook	of	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	
Studies 	with	Husserl.	Scheler	published	his	maiden	work	Towards	Phenomenology	
and	Theory	of	Sympathy	and	of	Love	and	Hate 	 (1913)	and	discussed	 the	 theory	
of	 empathy	 critically,	which	was	 a	 common	 interest	with	Husserl.	 It	was	no	
coincidence	that	at	the	same	period	Edith	Stein,	Husserl's	first	assistant,	wrote	her	
dissertation	titeled	Problems	of	Empathy 	(1917).	
But	Lipps'	 theory	cannot	be	 identified	simply	with	 the	above	mentioned	
theory	of	“other	minds”.	Since	the	latter	asks	the	question	“How	can	I	get	knowledge	
of	other	minds?”,	 the	problem	of	“other	mind”	 is	examined	within	the	 intellectual	
inquiry	 of	 “getting	 knowledge”	 and	Mill's	 theory	of	 “reasoning	by	 analogy”	 is	
presented	as	part	of	 the	same	discussion.	From	critics	against	such	 theory,	Lipps	
intended	 to	state	 that	 the	 theory	of	 “empathy”	was	not	an	 intellectual	 theory,	as	
it	had	an	emotional	or	 instinctive	dimension.	 If	we	may	say	more,	Husserl,	by	
criticizing	Lipps'	 theory	of	empathy,	 tried	 to	consider	 it	before	“other	minds”	and	
just	as	grasping	“other	body”	as	“living	body	(Leib)”.	This	was	a	trigger	to	let	Husserl	
think	again	about	 the	mind-body	relationship,	 just	as	Scheler	criticized	Mill	and	
Lipps	with	the	“undifferentiated	experience	of	mind-body”	and	lead	him	later	to	the	
idea	of	“pairing	 (Paarung)”	of	my	 lived	body	and	other	 lived	body,	which	we	can	
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find	in	Cartesian	Meditations .	
However,	 I	must	now	explain	why	 I	 said	at	 the	beginning	 that	Husserl	
wrestled	with	the	problem	of	“others”	as	a	fundamental	problem	of	philosophy	for	
the	first	time.	I	mean	that	whilst	Husserl	didn't	remain	concerned	with	the	problem	
of	“other	minds”	throughout	all	his	writings,	he	wrote	on	other	philosophical	issues,	
he	nonetheless	clearly	and	demonstrably	grasped	the	problem	of	“others”	in	wider	
sense	and	stated	 it	as	 the	“fundamental	problem	of	phenomenology”.	Considering	
“others”	as	a	 fundamental	problem	of	philosophy	doesn't	mean	anything	different	
from	stating	it	within	the	context	of	phenomenology	of	intersubjectivity.	He	tried	to	
discuss	his	 investigations	on	“others”	as	problematics	of	 intersubjectivity	since	his	
early	period.
5.　What is the “intersubjectivity” ?
We	may	say,	“intersubjectivity”	is	concerned	with	the	relationship	“between	
subject	and	subject”.	To	offer	a	metaphor,	imagine	we	were	observing	two	“subjects”	
at	the	same	distance	from	outside,	or	if	we	may	borrow	Merlau-Ponty's	expression	
“observing	from	a	bird's-eye	view	by	flying	in	the	sky”.	However,	one	of	two	subjects	
should	be	 just	 “I	myself”	and	 if	 I	 think	by	entering	 the	one,	 “another	subject”	 is	
called	 “the	other”.	Then	the	“between	subject	and	subject”	 is	called	 “between	me	
and	the	other”,	and	the	problem	of	“intersubjectivity”	 turns	up	as	 the	problem	of	
“others”,	or	differently	expressed,	we	can	say,	 the	problem	of	“others”	 turns	up	as	
one	side	of	the	problem	of	“intersubjectivity”,	although	the	problem	doesn't	however	
end	here.	
Through	the	modern	philosophy	the	term	“object”	was	used	as	an	antonym	
of	 “subject”.	Also	usually	we	hear	often	 the	confrontation	between	 “subjective”	
and	 “objective”,	 such	as	 in	 the	usage,	 “His	explanation	 is	 too	subjective”	or	 “Her	
explanation	 is	objective	and	 reliable”.	 “Subjective”	means	biased	 to	one's	own	
opinions	or	points	of	view	and	not	 taking	other's	opinion	 into	consideration,	 thus	
self-satisfied.	In	contrast	to	it,	“objective”	means	not	biased	to	any	specified	opinions	
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or	points	of	view,	not	contaminated	by	 them,	and	seeing	 the	 things	 “as	 it	were”.	
Therefore	“objects”	are	assumed	to	be	independent	from	“subject”	and	beings	(reality)	
in	 themselves,	 independent	 from	whether	 they	become	to	be	known	by	“subjects”	
or	not.	For	instance	the	Andromeda	Galaxy	apart	from	Earth	in	approximately	780	
kiloparsecs	at	the	velocity	of	light	existed	in	itself	since	far	earlier	times	than	it	was	
discovered	by	humans.	 It	 is	assumed	to	be	an	existing	“object”	 independent	 from	
human	“subjects”.
Immanuel	Kant,	however,	called	such	“objects”	that	are	assumed	to	exist	“in	
themselves”,	to	be	“things	in	themselves”	and	thought	that	they	are	unknowable	and	
that	they	can	come	into	existence	in	the	relationship	with	“subjects”	in	so	far	as	they	
are	recognized	and	become	“appearances”.	As	far	as	we	can	say	so,	the	recognition	
can	come	 into	effect	only	 in	 the	 frameworks	of	 “subjects”	 (i.e.	 time	and	space	
in	 the	sensitivity	and	 forms	of	category	 in	 the	understanding)	which	Kant	called	
“transcendental”.	Such	 frameworks	are	 “what	precedes	experience	and	makes	 it	
possible”.	Kant	thought	that	such	“transcendental”	functions	are	innate	in	“subjects”,	
subjects	that	are	not	empirical	or	 individual	“subjects”,	but	so	to	speak	are	“trans-
individual	subjects”.	
Although	Husserl	grasped	the	fundamental	 idea	of	phenomenology	 in	his	
Logical	 Investigations ,	he	 thought	 that	 it	 is	hidden	by	the	view	of	world	which	 is	
taken	for	granted	in	the	everyday	life	(which	he	called	“natural	attitude”)	and	that	
the	method	of	“phenomenological	reduction”	(“taking	it	in	parenthesis”	or	“shutting	
down”	or	in	Greek	word	“epoché”)	is	necessary	in	order	to	get	the	phenomenological	
view.	Around	 the	year	of	publishing	Logical	 Investigations 	Husserl	visited	Ernst	
Mach	who	had	used	 the	 term	 “phenomenology”	already.	Probably	recommended	
by	him	Husserl	 read	Richard	Avenarius'	Human	Concept	of	World .	 In	Husserl's	
manuscript	 for	his	 lecture	 “Fundamental	Problems	of	Phenomenology”	 in	 the	first	
volume	of	Towards	Phenomenology	of	 Intersubjectivity 	he	discussed	 the	 “natural	
attitude”	 in	context	with	Avenarius'	 “natural	concept	of	world”	and	began	to	 talk	
about	 the	 idea	of	 “phenomenological	reduction”.	This	 idea	began	to	grow	up	 for	
the	first	 time	during	his	stay	 in	Seefeld	 in	Tirol	 in	 the	summer	of	1905.	While	he	
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had	an	 interest	 in	Kant	 in	 the	background,	Pfänder	and	Daubert,	both	disciples	
of	Lipps,	had	accompanied	his	 stay.	We	can	presume	 that	 the	awaking	of	 the	
idea	of	 reduction	and	the	commitment	with	Lipps'	 theory	of	empathy	 introduced	
by	both	scholars	were	progressing	at	 the	same	time.	 In	order	 to	develop	his	 idea	
of	 “phenomenological	 reduction”	Husserl	 learned	Descartes'	 “methodological	
skepsis”	as	a	method	for	getting	a	view	of	 the	new	world	of	phenomenology,	but	
tried	 to	 interpret	 it	as	a	way	 leading	 to	 the	dimension	of	Kant's	 “transcendental”	
problematics.	But	Husserl	 thought,	 if	he	regarded	 the	 “subject”	as	 functioning	 in	
this	“transcendental”	dimension	as	a	human	being	within	the	world,	he	fell	 into	a	
paradoxical	situation	 that	what	 is	only	a	part	of	 the	world	holds	 the	whole	world	
(he	called	it	“paradox	of	subjectivity”).	Just	in	order	to	solve	the	paradox	he	stepped	
into	the	direction	regarding	the	“transcendental	subjectivity”	as	“intersubjectivity”.	
It	was	the	reason	why	the	idea	of	“reduction”	and	the	interest	in	“intersubjectivity”	
developed	almost	simultaneously.
It	 is	 also	 interesting	 that	Husserl	 in	Cartesian	Meditations 	of	his	 late	
period	 introduced	 the	 term	 “monad”	 from	Gottfried	Wilhelm	Leibnitz,	 rephrased	
“intersubjective”	with	“intermonadic”,	and	that	his	 interest	 in	this	term	began	very	
early,	almost	in	the	same	period	of	his	interest	 in	the	problem	of	intersubjectivity.	
It	means,	although	 the	problem	of	 “I	and	others”	 can	be	easily	connected	with	
Cartesian	 Egology,	 he	 thought	 about	 it	 in	 the	 connection	with	 Leibnitzian	
Monadology.	The	egological	appearance	was	set	within	the	pluralistic	framework.	
In	 this	way,	 the	 idea	of	 “intersubjectivity”	 didn't	 stay	as	 the	problem	
“between	subject	and	subject”,	but	migrated	to	 the	 idea	 that	“object”	“in	 itself”	 is	
born	 “intersubjectively”.	This	 is	 just	 the	 reason	why	Husserl	came	 in	 the	1920's	
to	 think	that	his	phenomenology	so	far	was	only	“static”	and	intended	to	take	the	
essential	 structure	 in	 the	present	out,	but	 in	order	 to	understand	 the	 structure	
genuinely	 it	must	be	complemented	by	a	 “genetic”	 investigation.	 It	demanded	of	
him	a	 fundamental	change	of	phenomenological	method,	and	at	 the	same	time	 it	
brought	the	above	mentioned	“subject”	 into	the	problematics	of	“intersubjectivity”.	
Neither	 “object”	nor	 “subject”	 is	 something	which	exists	 independently	and	 later	
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goes	 into	 relationship,	 rather	 “subject”	 is	born	 just	within	 the	 relationship	with	
“other	subjects”	and	it's	“genesis”	should	come	into	question.	In	his	 late	period	he	
paraphrased	the	term	“empathy”	he	loaned	from	Lipps	with	the	term	“other/foreign-
experience	 (Fremderfahrung)”,	 incidentally	 speaking,	 the	German	word	 “fremd”	
means	“other”	as	well	as	“foreign”	or	“strange”.	And	he	put	not	only	its	structure	but	
also	its	genesis	into	question.	In	this	context	he	found	the	pass	to	“others”	that	were	
hidden	in	his	theory	of	time	in	his	later	period.	This	is	the	idea	that	Husserl	found	
the	pass	 to	 “intersubjectivity”	 in	 the	most	central	core	of	 “I”,	 if	 I	may	here	only	
suggest	it.	
So	far	I've	discussed	that	Husserl's	problematics	of	“intersubjectivity”	were	
connected	to	traditional	or	contemporary	philosophers.	Now	I	would	like	to	mention	
that	 they	are	 intertwined	with	most	of	problems	he	 investigated	 in	various	ways.	
Besides	what	I	mentioned	already,	we	can	point	out	their	connection	to	psychology	
(Husserliana	vol.9),	nature	and	spirit	(Husserliana	vol.32),	theory	of	time	(Husserliana	
vol.10,	33,	Materialien 	vol.8),	 the	 lifeworld	 (Husserliana 	vol.6,	39),	 even	 if	we	
can't	 insist	 that	he	developed	them	enough.	It	 is	not	without	reason	that	Towards 	
Phenomenology	of	Intersubjectivity 	with	totally	1,914	pages	are	composed	of	three	
volumes	of	Husserliana 	within	40	volumes	up	to	now	and	overwhelming	in	his	left	
posthumous	manuscripts	not	only	 in	 the	quantity	but	also	 in	 the	 length	of	period	
where	he	discussed	it.	
6.　Ontology and phenomenology
At	any	rate,	why	do	 the	problematics	of	 “intersubjectivity”	 spread	 their	
roots	 so	widely	 in	most	 of	 problems	he	 investigated	 in	his	 phenomenology?	
It	must	have	a	 reason.	One	clue	 for	 it	 lies	 in	 the	nature	of	 “phenomenology”.	
“Phenomenology”	 is	proposed	 in	contrast	 to	 “ontology”	above	all.	 If	we	may	say	
that	“ontology”	is	a	question	of	“What	is	being?”	or	“What	exists?”,	we	can	say	that	
“phenomenology”	 is	a	question	of	“What	 is	a	phenomenon?”	or	“What	appears?”.	
I	would	 like	 to	compare	both	situations	of	 saying	 “Something	exists”	and	saying	
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“Something	appears”.	If	I	say	“Something	exists”,	“For	whom”	is	out	of	the	question,	
whereas	 if	 I	 say	 “Something	appears”,	 “For	whom”	 is	an	 indispensable	question.	
Without	somebody	“for	whom	something	appears”	we	cannot	talk	about	“appearing”	
with	meaning.	
Then,	 that	 something	appears	 for	A	 (me)	and	 that	 it	appears	 for	B	 (the	
other)	 are	not	always	 the	 same	 situation.	There	 is	 a	gap	between	 them	which	
Husserl	 called	 “perspective”	 or	 “aspect”,	 in	 order	 to	 point	 out	 that	 the	 same	
thing	seems	to	appear,	but	a	subtly	different	 thing	appears.	And	 if	A	grasps	 it	as	
“appearance	for	A”,	it	presupposes	already	that	it	has	for	B	a	different	“appearance	
for	B”.	What	is	more,	it	means	that	A	grasps	the	thing	as	something	beyond	it	which	
A	can't	collect	 into	“appearance	 for	A”.	Then	we	see	 that	something	appearing	 in	
appearance	appears	as	something	beyond	appearance.	What	supports	this	situation	
is	our	understanding	each	other	that	there	is	a	gap	between	“appearance	for	A”	and	
“appearance	for	B”.	It	means	that	problematics	of	“intersubjectivity”	come	into	the	
structure	of	“appearance”	in	itself.	
Then	we	can	see	that	the	problematics	of	“intersubjectivity”	are	related	to	
one	of	fundamental	concepts	of	phenomenology,	i.e.	the	term	“intentionality”	which	
Husserl	 learned	 from	his	 teacher	Franz	Brentano.	The	situation	 I	 just	mentioned	
that	something	appearing	in	appearance	appears	as	something	beyond	appearance	
is	another	side	of	the	same	coin	as	what	Husserl	said	that	consciousness	is	always	
“consciousness	 of	 something”	 and	 intends	 to	 something	 beyond	 experience.	
“Intentionality”	 is	not	a	 secondary	 relationship	 “between	subject	and	object”,	 in	
which	both	exist	 independently	already,	but	means	a	 “field”	 from	which	 “subject	
and	 object”	 come	 to	 exist	 simultaneously.	What	 exists	 primarily	 is	 just	 the	
“between”	of	“intentionality”	–	 the	between	“subject	and	object”.	The	very	 idea	of	
“intentionality”	breaks	the	dualistic	scheme	of	“subject	and	object”,	and	gave	birth	
to	the	idea	of	“between”.	Thus,	we	can	say	that	the	idea	of	“intentionality”	prepared	
the	phenomenology	of	 “intersujectivity”.	Thus	problematics	of	 “intersubjectivity”	
became	the	“fundamental	problems	of	phenomenology”	and	became	related	to	the	
fundamental	concept	of	phenomenology,	i.e.	“intentionality”.	This	is	just	the	clue	to	
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solve	why	almost	every	problem	Husserl	investigated	is	connected	to	problematics	
of	“intersubjectivity”.	
7.　Conclusion
In	 parallel	 with	 my	 research	 on	 “ intersubjectivity”	 of	 Husserl 's	
phenomenology,	since	2002	I	have	been	also	engaged	with	the	problem	of	“caring”	
as	one	of	concrete	fields	of	“intersubjectivity”.	With	this	term	“caring”	I	don't	mean	
only	 “nursing”	 for	patients	 in	a	narrow	sense,	but	also	 “caring”	 in	a	wider	sense	
including	 “caring”	 for	children,	elderly,	people	with	various	disabilities,	palliative	
caring	and	up	to	end-of-life	caring,	or	differently	speaking,	up	to	“caring	for	others”	
in	our	everyday	 life,	not	only	 for	humans	but	also	 for	animals	or	plants.	 In	 this	
wide	field,	 from	the	background	of	my	research	of	“intersubjectivity”,	 I	have	been	
engaged	with	 thinking	how	“to	 live	 together	with	others”,	what	 I	cannot	however	
unfortunately	develop	today.
Recently	 in	Japan	 there	was	a	horrible	and	abominable	 incident.	 In	 the	
newspaper	reported:	“A	knife-wielding	man	went	on	a	rampage	early	Tuesday	at	a	
care	facility	for	people	with	disabilities	in	Sagamihara,	Kanagawa	Prefecture,	killing	
at	least	19	people	and	wounding	25	others,	20	of	them	seriously,	in	one	of	the	worst	
mass	killings	 in	modern	Japanese	history.”	 (July,	26.	2016)	The	suspect,	a	 former	
staff	of	 this	care	facility	 for	people	with	 intellectual	disabilities,	hand-delivered	on	
February	a	written	petition	 to	 the	official	 residence	of	 the	Lower	House	speaker	
in	Tokyo	demanding	 that	people	with	severe	disabilities	would	be	euthanized.	 It	
is	also	reported,	he	said	“I	want	 to	kill	disabled	people	as	 they	are	worthless,	but	
the	government	does	not	give	me	permission”.	 I'm	afraid	that	people	consider	 the	
suspect	as	a	special	wicked	ghoul,	a	mentally	diseased	or	a	narcotic.	In	my	opinion	
we	should	elucidate	how	he	got	such	an	idea	and	whether	he	got	it	from	the	inner	
hidden	eugenics	widely	spread	in	the	unconscious	zone	of	normal	people	as	well.	
From	such	an	investigation	we	should	learn	how	“to	live	together	with	others”.	Also	
in	this	context,	I	hope,	a	research	on	Husserl's	phenomenology	of	intersubjectivity	
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could	play	an	important	role.	
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